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I. INTRODUCTION
Indian law and the Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter the Code) rarely collide.
Very few legal scholars with expertise in one area like to spend time in the other one.
At first glance, it seems as though these two areas of the law seem to have almost
nothing in common. Still, American Indian tribes are subject to the provisions of the
Code, and like other taxpayers, they occasionally have disagreements with the
Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter IRS) with respect to what the Code says. With
Federal Indian law entering the equation, the already complicated provisions of the
Code can become even less clear. These two areas of law do collide occasionally,
and the results can cause some head scratching among those familiar with both areas.
That is exactly what happened in the two cases that are at the center of this Note.
In a span of three weeks in April, 2000, two U.S. Circuit Courts came to
completely opposite conclusions with respect to the same factual situations. In both
cases, a federally recognized Indian tribe was suing the government for the refund of
excise taxes paid on the sales of “pull-tab” games, which are commonly sold by
tribes and non-profit organizations as a means of fundraising. Both cases brought
together various statutes from the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act1 (the IGRA) and
the Code, as well as other treaties and canons of construction.
The first decision, Chickasaw Nation v. United States,2 decided on April 5th in
the Tenth Circuit, held that the tribe was not exempt from paying excise taxes on
these games.3 The second decision, Little Six, Inc. v. United States,4 decided on
April 24th by the Federal Circuit, held that the tribe was exempt from these excise
taxes. These results were contradictory in spite of the fact that the factual situations
were virtually identical and involved the same statutes. The complexity of the
statutes makes the issue a cloudy one and resulted in the contradictory outcomes.
The Supreme Court has now decided to review the matter. It granted a petition for
certiorari in the Chickasaw Nation case,5 but a date for the oral arguments has not yet
been set.
This Note will explore the reasons why two identical cases can turn out with
completely different results. To do so, consideration will be given to the statutes
involved and the varying interpretations of these statutes. Another important
consideration is the policy behind these statutes, especially the IGRA. Part II will
describe what the pull-tab games are, the statutes at issue, the conflicting cases, and
the statutory interpretation issue. Part III will describe how the tenets of Indian Law
can affect the analysis. Part IV will contain an analysis of the statutes and compare it
to how the courts analyzed them. Part IV will also explore how issues and policies
1

25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2000).

2

208 F.3d 871 (10th Cir. 2000).

3

Actually, Chickasaw Nation represents two cases, itself and a companion case, Choctaw
Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 210 F.3d 389 (10th Cir. 2000). Choctaw Nation, which
again involved the same factual scenario and issues as Chickasaw Nation, was decided on the
same day by the same panel of judges. The brief opinion in Choctaw Nation stated that it
affirmed summary judgment to the government based on its opinion in Chickasaw Nation.
Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma, 210 F.3d at 389.
4

210 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

5

69 U.S.L.W. 46224 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2001) (No. 00-507).
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more specific to Indian law should be weighed in the analysis of the statute. Finally,
the Note will conclude that the decision in Little Six, Inc. is the correct one.
II. THE BACKGROUND OF CHICKASAW NATION AND LITTLE SIX
A. What Are These “Pull-Tab” Games?
The pull-tab games that became the center of this controversy are a relatively
common and simple form of gambling. Anyone who has been to a church festival or
a bingo hall has probably seen them all over the place. The game itself is simply a
ticket containing four or five windows with tabs on the back of the ticket.6 Players
pull off the tabs to reveal a combination of symbols. If the symbols on the back of
the card match a group of symbols on the front, the player wins a prize. The concept
is similar to that of instant scratch-off tickets sold by a number of state lottery
agencies. The cards are sold in a series of 24,000 tickets, and the number of winning
tickets are arranged so that once the entire box is sold, the seller makes a profit.7
The tribes involved in Chickasaw Nation and Little Six, Inc. sell these games on
their reservations, including in gaming centers and convenience stores. Players can
then redeem their prizes immediately at the point of sale or claim them later.8
B. The Statutes Involved
1. Internal Revenue Code § 4401
Section 4401(a) of the Code imposes an excise tax on all types of wagers. That
statute reads:
(1) State authorized wagers – There shall be imposed on any wager authorized
under the law of the State in which accepted an excise tax equal to 0.25 percent of
the amount of such wager.
(2) Unauthorized wagers – There shall be imposed on any such wager not
described in paragraph (1) an excise tax equal to 2 percent of the amount of such
wager.9
However, § 4402(3) grants an exemption from the tax imposed in § 4401 to a
“state-conducted lottery.” It states that no tax shall be imposed by this subchapter:
On any wager placed in a sweepstakes, wagering pool, or lottery which is
conducted by an agency of a state acting under authority of State law, but
only if such wager is placed with the State agency conducting such
sweepstakes, wagering pool, or lottery, or with its authorized employees
or agents.10

6

See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 874 (describing how the pull-tab games work).

7

See id. at 877.

8

See id.

9

I.R.C. § 4401(a) (2000).

10

Id. § 4402(3) (2000).
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It seems understandable that Congress would want to exempt state lotteries from
being liable for the excise tax since the profits from these lotteries go to fund public
projects, such as schools.11
Additionally, § 4411 imposes an occupational tax on each person who is liable
for the tax imposed by § 4401.12 The language and other details of the statute are not
particularly important to the controversies in Chickasaw Nation and Little Six, Inc.;
the statute just raised the stakes as far as the amount of money involved in the cases.
Sections 4401, 4402(3), and 4411 are all in Chapter 3513 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which is entitled “Taxes on Wagering.” Chapter 35’s reference in
§ 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA results in confusion because nothing in Chapter 35
particularly relates to the rest of the language of § 2719(d)(1). To find out why this
is the case, it is necessary to look at § 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA.
2. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act14 was enacted by Congress in 1988. The
purpose of the IGRA, according to the legislation, was “to promote tribal economic
development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government.”15 However,
most commentators at the time agreed that the real purpose of the legislation was to
quell states’ fear of competition from both regulated and unregulated Indian
gaming.16 That fear was greatly fueled by the Supreme Court’s decision in
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.17
In fact, the IGRA was enacted largely, if not entirely, as a reaction “to a series of
federal court decisions, culminating in” Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.18 In
Cabazon Band, the State of California tried to apply its gambling regulations to tribal
gaming facilities consisting of bingo halls and card clubs.19 In analyzing the case,
the Court noted that there is an overall federal interest in “encouraging tribal self-

11

For example, Article XV, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution requires that all profits
from the Ohio Lottery be used to fund public schools. Other states have similar requirements.
For example, California requires that 34 percent of total lottery revenues be allocated to the
benefit of public education. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8880.4(a)(2) (West 2000).
12

See I.R.C. § 4411(a) (2000).

13

I.R.C. §§ 4401-24 (2000).

14

25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21.

15

See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).

16

Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How IGRA Shapes the Politics
of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 381, 400
(1997).
17

480 U.S. 202 (1987).

18

Rand & Light, supra note 16, at 382.

19

Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at 204-05. The dispute arose because the
bingo and card games operated by the tribe allegedly violated California laws which limited
prizes and required that profits be kept in special accounts and used for charitable purposes.
The tribes admitted that the games violated the prize limits but claimed that the state did not
have the authority to enforce these gambling laws within the reservations. Id. at 206.
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sufficiency and economic development,”20 and asserted that the tribes’ interests were
identical.21 The Court determined that federal and tribal interests pre-empted
California’s authority to regulate Indian gaming operations.22 Essentially, the Court
stated that even if a state were to only allow minor forms of gambling within its
borders, any tribe in that state could conduct any form of gambling, including casino
games and slot machines, as long as operations were conducted on Indian lands
under tribal sovereignty.23 Naturally, states were concerned with a lack of control
over Indian gaming within its borders. This concern provided the impetus for
Congress to enact the IGRA.
The IGRA allocates jurisdictional responsibility for regulating Indian gaming
according to the types of gaming involved. The more “high-stakes” the games are,
the more control states have over their regulation. The IGRA establishes three
classes of gaming. Class I gaming includes gaming associated with traditional
Indian ceremonies and is subject to exclusive tribal jurisdiction on tribal lands.24
Class II gaming includes bingo and nonbanking card games, such as poker, that meet
certain state provisions,25 and are allowed on tribal lands in states that permit such
types of gaming for any purpose by any person.26 The tribes may regulate Class II
gaming with oversight from the National Indian Gaming Commission.27 Class III
gaming includes all types of gaming not included in Class I or Class II.28 These are
typically the high-stakes casino games such as slot machines, roulette, and blackjack.
Tribes must have a tribal-state compact in order to operate Class III gaming.29 The
pull-tab games at issue in these cases were classified as Class II games.30
The specific provision of the IGRA that became a central issue in Chickasaw
Nation and Little Six, Inc. is § 2719(d)(1), which requires that the reporting and
withholding of taxes under certain provisions of the Code should be applied to Indian
gaming in the same manner as those provisions apply to state gaming operations.
Section 2719(d)(1) states:
The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (including sections
1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050I, and Chapter 35 of such Code) concerning
the reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings from
gaming or wagering operations shall apply to Indian gaming operations
20

Id. at 216.

21

Id. at 219.

22

Id. at 221-22.

23

Rand & Light, supra note 16, at 210-14.

24

See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1).

25

Id. § 2703(7)(A).

26

Id. § 2710(b)(1)(A).

27

Id. § 2706(b). The Commission was established in the IGRA as an agency to administer
the provisions of the IGRA. It is in the Department of the Interior. See id. § 2704.
28

25 U.S.C. § 2703(8).

29

Id. § 2710(d)(1)(C).

30

See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 881; Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1364.
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conducted pursuant to this chapter, or under a Tribal-State compact
entered into under section 2710(d)(3) of this title that is in effect, in the
same manner as such provisions apply to State gaming and wagering
operations.31
The problem is that the statute aims to apply certain provisions of the Code
concerning “the reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings from
gaming or wagering operations” to Indian gaming operations in the same manner as
those provisions apply to State gaming and wagering operations.32 Those provisions
are to include some sections referenced in the parenthetical phrase inserted in the
statute. However, included in the parenthetical is a reference to Chapter 35 of the
Code, which is a chapter imposing excise and occupational taxes. It could be argued
that Congress meant to apply the taxes imposed in Chapter 35 to the tribes in the
same manner as they are applied to state gaming operations. Under that
interpretation, the tribes would be exempt from the taxes imposed by Chapter 35
because § 4402(3) exempts state gaming operations from these taxes.33 On the other
hand, it could be argued that Congress only intended that this statute apply to the
reporting and withholding requirements of the Code, as the language outside the
parenthetical in § 2719(d)(1) would indicate. Under that interpretation, since
Chapter 35 does not deal with reporting and withholding requirements, it would not
apply to the tribes in the same manner as it is to the states. Therefore, the tribes
would not be exempt from the taxes in Chapter 35. The parenthetical was probably
inserted in an effort to make the statute more understandable. However, it did the
opposite, leading to the confusion which culminated in the disagreements in
Chickasaw Nation and Little Six, Inc.
C. The Cases at the Center of This Controversy
1. The Basic Factual Background
The factual backgrounds for these cases are virtually identical. Both cases
involved tribes who were selling the pull-tab games on their reservations. The
Chickasaw Nation (the Nation), and presumably Little Six, Inc., though the opinion
in its case does not mention it, withheld income taxes from the winnings of players
in accordance with § 3402(q)34 of the Code. The Nation also filed informational
returns with the IRS concerning these winnings.35 Neither tribe, however, paid the
wagering excise taxes under § 4401 or the related occupational tax under § 4411.36
31

25 U.S.C. § 2719(d)(1).

32

Id.

33

See I.R.C. § 4402(3).

34

See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 874. Under § 3402(q)(3)(B) of the Code, a state
agency conducting a lottery or wagering activity is to withhold an amount equal to 28 percent
of any payment over $5,000 made to the winner of a state lottery. The result is that the agency
(and the IRS) does not need to go to the trouble of processing withholding paperwork for a
player who has won a small prize.
35

Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 874.

36

See id.
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The IRS conducted an audit of both tribes and determined that they were both liable
for these taxes.37 The tribes paid the assessment under protest and filed suit for a
refund.38
2. The First Decision – Chickasaw Nation v. United States
The Chickasaw Nation is a tribe with its principal place of business in
Oklahoma.39 The IRS determined that the Nation owed about $45,000 in wagering
and occupational taxes related to its sales of the pull-tab games for the period from
August 1991 to August 1994.40 After the government was granted summary
judgment in the District Court,41 the Nation raised four grounds for appeal: (1) The
pull-tabs do not constitute a “taxable wager” under § 4421 of the Code; (2) the tribe
is not a “person” subject to federal wagering excise taxes; (3) the IGRA
demonstrated a Congressional intent not to subject Indian gaming to federal
wagering excise taxes; and (4) “the self-government guarantee of the 1855 treaty
between the United States and the Nation precludes the imposition of these taxes.”42
First, the Court had to determine whether the pull-tab games could be considered
a “lottery” under § 4421(2)(A) of the Code. That section defines “lottery” as:
(2)Lottery – The term “lottery” includes the numbers game, policy, and similar
types of wagering. The term does not include –
(A) Any game of a type in which usually
(i) The wagers are placed
(ii) The winners are determined, and
(iii) The distribution of prizes or other property is made, in the presence of
all persons placing wagers in such game, and
(B) Any drawing conducted by an organization exempt from tax under sections
501 and 521, if no part of the net proceeds derived from such drawing inures to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.43
The Court noted that the word “includes” in the statutory definition signals an intent
to include within the definition various types of gaming not specifically mentioned in
the statute, and then turned to the dictionary definitions of the word “lottery” for
assistance.44 Black’s Law Dictionary states that the “[e]ssential elements of a lottery
are consideration, prize and chance and any scheme or device by which a person for
a consideration is permitted to receive a prize or nothing as may be determined
predominantly by chance.”45 Using this definition, the Court concluded that the pulltab system does constitute a lottery. The system utilized by the Nation is a scheme
37

See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 874; Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1363.

38

See id.

39

See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 874.

40

See id.

41

1998 WL 975690 (E.D. Okla. 1998).

42

See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 875.

43

I.R.C. § 4421(2).

44

See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 876.

45

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 947 (6th ed. 1990).
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by which prizes are randomly distributed to the winners who have paid for a chance
to win them.46 The Court disagreed with the Nation’s argument that each individual
pull-tab should be viewed as a separate game. That argument would place the pulltabs in the statutory exclusion of § 4421(2) because the wager would be placed when
the player buys the ticket, the winners would be determined when the player pulls the
tabs off of the back of the ticket, and the prize would be distributed in the presence
of all persons placing wagers, as the player would be the only player of that game, so
the prize would be distributed in his presence. The Court instead adopted the District
Court’s conclusion that when each customer purchases a pull-tab, “he is competing
against every other person who purchases a pull-tab from the same series.”47 This is
because “the tickets are purchased and resold by the Nation in series of 24,000
tickets, with a specific number of winning tickets randomly distributed throughout
the series.”48 Prizes for a particular series “are not awarded all at one time or in the
same location.”49 Accordingly, the Court found that the pull-tab games are not
within the statutory exclusion to the definition of “lottery” in § 4421(2).
The next argument centered on whether the tribe was a “person” subject to the
taxes imposed by §§ 4401 and 4411. Section 7701(a)(1) of the Code states that
“[t]he term ‘person’ shall be construed to mean and include an individual, trust,
estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.”50 Again, the Court noted
that because of the use of the word “include” in the definition, Congress did not
mean for this list to be exhaustive.51 The Court then cited a number of cases that
concluded that the word “person,” as defined in the Code, encompasses legal entities
not specifically listed in the statutory definition.52 Based on that reasoning, the court
concluded that § 7701(a)(1) “unambiguously encompasses all legal entities that are
the subject of rights and duties and that Indian tribes are such legal entities.”53
The next argument concerned the purpose stated in the IGRA.54 The Nation
contended “that the imposition of federal wagering excise taxes and the
accompanying … occupational taxes on its pull-tab games is contrary to both the
spirit and letter of the IGRA.” The Nation argued that a purpose of the Act was to
“maximize tribal gaming revenues.”55 The Court disagreed, stating that while
46

See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 877.

47

Id.

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

I.R.C. § 7701(a)(1) (2000).

51

See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 880.

52

In fact, the Eighth Circuit has specifically held that the word “person” as it is used in §§
6421 and 6675 of the Code encompasses Indian tribes. See Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v.
United States, 197 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 1999).
53

Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 880.

54

25 U.S.C. § 2702, which stated the purpose of the IGRA, included language indicating a
purpose “to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means
of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.”
55

See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 881.
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“Congress was interested in promoting tribal economic development and selfsufficiency,56 there is no mention of the phrase “maximizing tribal gaming revenues”
anywhere in the IGRA.57
Then the Court discussed the language of § 2719(d). The Nation argued that the
statute showed Congress’ intent not to apply the Code provisions creating tax
liability. This was because § 2719(d)(1) identifies as applicable only a specific type
of code provision and omits others.58 The Court rejected the argument, first because
it believed that it was “clear that § 2719(d) does not expressly prohibit the imposition
of federal wagering or … occupational taxes on Indian gaming operations.”59 The
statute only provides that Indian gaming operations are required to report and
withhold certain player winnings in the same manner as state gaming operations.
Applying the language of the statute to the wagering taxes would be an inference
from the reference to Chapter 35 made in the parenthetical in § 2719(d)(1), and the
Court thought that it would be unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to
create a tax exemption by way of a negative inference in § 2719(d)(1).60
The Nation finally attempted to persuade the Court that its interpretation of
§ 2719(d) was correct based on a letter sent by Senator Daniel Inouye, one of the
authors of the IGRA, to the Commissioner of the IRS.61 His letter stated that
“Congress intended that the tax treatment of wagers conducted by Tribal
governments be the same as that for wagers conducted by state governments under
Chapter 35 of the Internal Revenue Code.”62 Therefore, since wagers conducted by
state governments are exempted from the taxes by § 4402(3) of the Code,63 the tribes
should also be exempt. However, this letter was sent four years after the enactment
of the statute, and the Court thought that the comments of one senator would have
little value in interpreting the statute.64 The Court also found that Senator Inouye’s
interpretation was inconsistent with both the statute’s language and legislative
history.65 That is because the language of § 2719(d)(1) only speaks to the provisions
of the Code concerning the reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to the
winnings from gaming operations.66 Additionally, the Court noted that the original
language of the bill that became the IGRA included an explicit exemption for Indian
gaming from the federal wagering tax. However, this exemption was deleted prior to

56

See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).

57

See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 881.

58

See id. at 882.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 883.

61

See id.

62

See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 883.

63

See I.R.C. § 4402(3).

64

Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 883.

65

Id.

66

See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(d)(1).
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the IGRA’s passage.67 Finally, the Court dismissed a claim from the Tribe that its
treaty with the United States, signed in 1855, provided it with an exemption from the
taxes at issue.68
3. The Second Decision – Little Six, Inc. v. United States
Little Six, Inc., is actually a wholly owned corporation of the Shakopee
Mdewakanton Sioux Community, based in South Dakota.69 The audit conducted by
the IRS resulted in an assessment of nearly $175,000 in wagering and occupational
taxes.70 Little Six brought suit for a refund of taxes paid after the assessment, and
the government was awarded summary judgment in the Court of Federal Claims.71
The line of reasoning in that decision was similar to that in Chickasaw Nation.
In the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Little Six, Inc. Court’s
analysis began with a discussion of whether the pull-tab games were wagers subject
to taxation in §§ 4401 and 4411. Little Six argued that these tax provisions only
applied to wagers authorized under state law, and since their wagers were authorized
under federal law,72 the provisions did not apply to their pull-tab games.73 However,
this argument failed because the IGRA authorizes pull-tab games as long as “such
Indian gaming is located within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by
any person, organization, or entity.”74 Because these types of wagers have to be
authorized by the state in which the wagers take place, the wagers placed under the
IGRA are state authorized under § 4401 of the Code.75 Then came the discussion of
§ 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA.
The analysis began by concluding that § 2719(d)(1) applies Chapter 35 of the
Code to Indian gaming in the same manner as it does to state gaming, because
Chapter 35 is mentioned in the parenthetical in the statue.76 Therefore, § 2719(d)(1)
can be reasonably construed to provide an exemption to the wagering excise tax for
wagers placed on lotteries and pull-tab games conducted by Indian tribes, because
the Internal Revenue Code provides such an exemption to state gaming operations in
§ 4402(3) of the Code.77
67

See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 882-83.

68

See id. at 884. Article VII of that treaty granted certain aspects of self-government to the
Nation, but the court disagreed with the Nation’s argument that this right of self-government
could be construed to give rise to an exemption from federal excise taxes. Id.
69

See Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1362.

70

See id. at 1363.

71

Little Six, Inc. v. United States, 43 Fed.Cl. 80 (1999).

72

The tribe’s pull-tab wagers are authorized by another part of the IGRA, 25 U.S.C. §
2703(7)(A)(i), which defines “Class II” gaming to include pull-tabs. See Little Six, Inc., 210
F.3d at 1363.
73

See Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1363.

74

See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A).

75

Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1364.

76

Id. at 1365.

77

Id.
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Although it is true that § 2719(d)(1) only applies to those provisions that concern
“the reporting and withholding of taxes [from] winnings,” the Court noted that in
construing the statue, it had to give effect and meaning to all of its terms.78 The
Court then noted that the statute also explicitly refers to § 6050I and Chapter 35 of
the Code, which clearly do not relate to “winnings.”79 Section 6050I relates to
informational returns on cash transactions80 and Chapter 35 relates to excise and
occupational taxes on wagers.81 That, said the Court, would make the interpretation
proposed by the government superflouous, something which the Court wished to
avoid.82
The Court’s analysis concluded that § 2719(d)(1) is ambiguous.83 The Court
seemed ready to turn to the Indian Canon of Construction to settle the issue in favor
of Little Six. Before this could be done, though, the court dealt with the issue of the
interpretation of tax exemptions. Normally, tax exemptions are interpreted strictly.
However, the Supreme Court has noted that when the government is dealing with
Indians, the rule is the opposite. Instead of construing the exemption narrowly, it is
to be construed broadly.84 Therefore, the tribe had both the Indian Canon and the
Supreme Court’s tax exemption language working in its favor.
Finally, the Court relied on some of the IGRA’s legislative history to support its
conclusion. It noted that according to § 2702 of the IGRA, one of the primary
purposes of the IGRA was to promote tribal economic development and
sufficiency.85 The Court also stated that equal treatment of tribes and states with
respect to exemptions from federal wagering taxes is consistent with legislative
intent, and in accord with the concept of co-equal sovereignty.86 With that, the Court
concluded that the pull-tab games were exempt from the wagering taxes, and
reversed the lower Court.87
i. A Quick Note on the Government’s Petition for Rehearing
The result of Little Six, Inc. had to be a surprise to the government. Having won
a case with the same facts only a few weeks before, it was reasonable to expect the
same result. But that did not happen, so the government petitioned for a rehearing.
The petitions for both a rehearing and a rehearing en banc were denied.88
78

Id.

79

Id.

80

See I.R.C. § 6050I (2000).

81

See I.R.C. §§ 4401-24.

82

Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1365.

83

Id.

84

See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).

85

Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1366.

86

Id. (The Court cited S. REP. No. 466, at 13 (1988) (“The Committee concluded that the
compact process is a viable mechanism for setting various matters between two equal
sovereigns.”)).
87

Id.

88

Little Six, Inc. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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Judge Dyk, who was joined by Judges Newman and Plager, wrote a lengthy
dissent to the denial of the rehearing en banc. His first criticism was that he thought
the Little Six, Inc. panel was too fast in finding the statute ambiguous and, therefore,
resorting to the Indian Canon of Construction.89 He admitted that he did not agree
with the government’s argument that the reference to Chapter 35 was intended to
incorporate the definitions of “wagers” and “lotteries” in § 4421.90 This case, he
believed, presented a situation where it is impossible to give effect to all of the
statute’s language without rendering the statute self-contradictory.91 Instead of
resorting to the canon, said Judge Dyk, the Court should have examined the statute’s
structure, purpose, and history to come up with a coherent interpretation.92
Judge Dyk could not see how the parenthetical reference to Chapter 35 could be
used to create the exemption.93 It seemed unlikely to him that Congress would create
a significant tax exemption through a parenthetical reference, especially when the
reference is in a sentence which only discusses the reporting and withholding of
taxes on winnings.94
He also had a major disagreement with the Little Six, Inc. panel’s interpretation
of the IGRA’s legislative history. As the Chickasaw Nation Court noted, early
versions of § 2719(d)(1) would have exempted tribes from the wagering tax by
inserting the word “taxation” right before the words “reporting and withholding” in
the statute. Therefore, the statute would read: “Provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, as amended, concerning the taxation and the reporting and
withholding of taxes pursuant to the operation of a gambling or wagering operation
shall apply to the operations in accord with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act the
same as they apply to State operations.”95 That language, because it brings the word
“taxation” into the statute, would clearly result in an exemption from the taxes in §
4401 of the Code. Section 4401 is certainly a provision dealing with taxation; it
imposes a tax. However, the word “taxation” was removed in Committee.96 The
word “taxation” was replaced by the parenthetical phrase which contained the
reference to Chapter 35 and other sections.
Finally, Judge Dyk could not agree with the purpose of § 2719(d)(1), as
construed by the Little Six, Inc. panel.97 Simply put, a desire to “promote tribal
economic development and self-sufficiency” should not be extended to grant
additional benefits to the tribes.98 But the Court held that the statute did grant an

89

Id. at 1384.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Little Six, Inc., 229 F.3d at 1384.

94

Id. at 1384-85.

95

H.R. 1920, 99th Cong. § 4 (1986).

96

See Little Six, Inc., 229 F.3d at 1385.

97

Id.

98

Id. at 1385-86.
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additional benefit, and that benefit was an exemption from these wagering and
occupational taxes.
The government has since filed a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme
Court. Because the Court granted the petition in Chickasaw Nation,99 there seems to
be no reason for the Court not to also grant this petition and consolidate the cases.
D. The Indian Canon of Construction and Relations with the Federal Government
The Indian Canon of Construction is necessary because Indian law is full of
ambiguity. Specifically, the canon arose because of the ambiguous language used in
treaties made between the United States government and tribes in the early days of
the nation.100 Most of the treaties between Indians and the federal government are
over a hundred years old, so they do not speak in modern terms. The premise of the
canon was articulated by Chief Justice John Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia101
when he stated that the “language used in treaties with the Indians should never be
construed to their prejudice.”102 This idea has been extended to require that
ambiguous statutes, executive orders, and regulations be resolved in favor of
Indians.103
The reasons for the canon are many, and in spite of its extension to other forms of
law, a full understanding of the canon cannot be reached without looking at it in the
context of the early treaties made between the federal government and the Indians.
As white settlers moved to the west, treaties were used to remove the Indian tribes
out of the path of advancement.104 The Indians had little, if any, bargaining position,
and the results of the negotiations were almost always unsatisfactory to them.105
Additionally, many tribes had to deal with a language barrier at the treaty
negotiations. The treaties were always written in English, which was a very
unfamiliar language to most Indians, so it was almost a guarantee that semantic and
interpretational problems would arise.106
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia107 is another important Indian law case authored by
Chief Justice Marshall because it laid out a number of principles that are still at the

99

69 U.S.L.W. 3269 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2001) (No. 00-507).

100

See Erik M. Jensen, American Indian Law Meets the Internal Revenue Code: Warbus v.
Commissioner, 74 N.D. L. REV. 691, 695 (1998).
101

31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).

102

Id. at 582.

103

See Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty
Abogation: “As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth” – How Long a Time
Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601, 615 (1974).
104

Id. at 609.

105

Id. at 610.

106

Id.

107

30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (In Cherokee Nation, the tribe attempted to invoke original
jurisdiction in the United States Supreme Court by describing itself as a foreign nation. The
Court rejected that assertion, and Chief Justice Marshall set out those principles concerning
the relationship between the Indians and the government in his opinion.).
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core of the relationship between Indians and the federal government.108 Marshall
found that Indian tribes are “domestic dependent nations.”109 The tribes “look to our
government for protection,” resulting in a relationship between the government and
the Indians “resembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian.”110 The courts have since
expanded this notion of the trust relationship set forth by Marshall, extending it to
statutes, executive orders, and regulations.111
The canon is now a well established principle of law, although many scholars,
especially tax experts, are not aware of it.112 This canon does not come up frequently
in tax law, but when it does, some confusion in applying the canon in the context of
tax law can take place; hence the conflicting results in Chickasaw Nation and Little
Six, Inc.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE TAXABILITY OF INDIAN TRIBES AND PRIOR COLLISIONS
BETWEEN THE IRC AND THE INDIAN CANON OF CONSTRUCTION
A. The Taxability of Indian Tribes in General
The taxation of Indian tribes under the Internal Revenue Code has traditionally
been an issue that has puzzled both tax and Indian law scholars. The unique position
of tribes in our society has contributed to this. Indian tribes are distinct, independent
political entities and exert sovereignty over their land.113 In fact, because of this
sovereign status, states cannot tax tribes or activities conducted on reservations.114
The tribes elect political officers who enact civil and criminal laws administered by
tribal courts, and they hold title to tribal land.115 Tribes are subject to the ultimate
sovereignty of the federal government, and tribal members are United States
citizens.116 These qualities are similar to those inherent in states. Yet, Indian tribes
are not states or subdivisions thereof, but rather “domestic dependent nations.”117
Tribes are distinguishable from state governments because “the right of tribal selfgovernment is ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad power of
Congress.”118 Therefore, unlike states, tribes are unable to claim rights against the
federal government through the traditions and constitutional structures supporting the
108

Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 103, at 613.

109

Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.

110

Id.

111

Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 103, at 614-15.

112

Jensen, supra note 100.

113

Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 103, at 604.

114

Ellen P. Aprill, Tribal Bonds: Indian Sovereignty and the Tax Legislative Process, 46
ADMIN. L. REV. 333, 334 (1994).
115

Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 197 (1984).
116

Id.

117

See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 15-18.

118

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980).
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federalist system.119 The status of tribes does not conveniently fit into the
Constitution’s traditional power allocation rules.120
As a result, the treatment of Indian tribes in tax law has been rather ineffective
and inconsistent.121 Before the Tribal Tax Act of 1982, the Internal Revenue Service
was in charge of determining the tax treatment of tribal governments.122 Revenue
Ruling 67-284123 declared that “[i]ncome tax statutes do not tax Indian tribes. The
tribe is not a taxable entity.”124 This ruling was interesting because it gave no
analysis or basis for its conclusion, nor did it cite any statutory authority.125 That
ruling, however, dealt primarily with the federal income tax treatment of income
paid to or on behalf of enrolled members of Tribes.126 Why the Service made such a
broad statement about the taxability of tribes is unknown.
Subsequent litigation, unlike Revenue Ruling 67-284, drew on parallels between
tribal governments and state and local governments.127 After all, tribal governments
do have inherent powers and attributes of sovereignty,128 just as states do. But unlike
the states, the federal government has taken on a special responsibility toward tribal
governments. The federal government has developed a fiduciary obligation to the
tribal governments and has announced a policy of encouraging economic
development and self-sufficiency for tribes and their members.129 And Congress is
free to use any available means, including the tax code, to assist in furthering these
policies.
The IRS, however, refused to treat the tribes as political subdivisions, thereby
refusing to extend a variety of tax preferences enjoyed by state and local
governments that were not enjoyed by the tribes. In Revenue Ruling 68-231,130 the
IRS concluded that the interest on debt of tribal governments was not eligible for the

119

Newton, supra note 115, at 197.

120

Id. at 196.

121

Aprill, supra note 114, at 334.

122

Id. at 337.

123

1967-2 C.B. 55.

124

Id. at 58.

125
Aprill, supra note 114, at 337. The ruling also did not support the conclusion with a
policy analysis. The IRS did not even indicate what kind of entity the tribal government was,
it just concluded that the tribe is not a taxable entity. See id.
126
See 1967-2 C.B. at 56. The ruling went on to state that amounts paid to tribal council
members or officers are subject to income tax, and that tribal income not otherwise exempt
from Federal Income tax is includable in the gross income of the Indian tribal member when
distributed or constructively received by him. Id.
127

See Aprill, supra note 114, at 338.

128

See id. at 334.

129

See id. at 334-35.

130

1968-1 C.B. 48.
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exclusion from income tax provided by § 103 of the Code.131 The ruling stated that a
tribe “is not a division of the State, and since it exercises its governing powers by
virtue of Federal, rather than State authority, the bonds in question are not issued on
behalf the State within the meaning of the regulations under section 103(a).”132
Another tax dilemma arises in the treatment of business corporations owned by
tribes. Little Six, Inc. is actually a wholly owned corporation of a tribe in South
Dakota,133 but that was not the difference between the Chickasaw Nation and Little
Six, Inc. results. Granted, a literal reading of the Code would tax tribal corporations
the same as any other corporation, but Revenue Ruling 81-295134 stated that the
corporation is coextensive with the tribe itself, so it shared the exempt status of the
tribe for income earned on the reservation.135 The IRS applied a policy analysis in
this ruling, stating that “the political entity embodied in the concept of an Indian tribe
has been recognized.” The IRS then cited Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,136 to
support the proposition that no income tax liability has been asserted against a tribe
with respect to tribal income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the
reservation.137
In 1982, Congress finally weighed in on the matter by passing the Indian Tribal
Governmental Tax Status Act, which is frequently referred to as the “Tribal Tax
Act” and codified as § 7871 of the Internal Revenue Code.138 Essentially, the Tribal
Tax Act treats tribal governments in the same way in which state governments are
treated under certain provisions of the Code. Most significantly, it grants tribes the
benefits of § 103139 as long as the proceeds from the debt obligations issued by the
tribal government are to be used for essential government functions.140 Also

131
See I.R.C. § 103(c)(1) (2000). This section allows the holder of a bond issued by a state
or local government to exclude interest earned on that bond from gross income on his or her
tax return. The benefit for the government is that it can pay a lower interest rate on the debt
than a taxable entity would while giving the same net return to the investor. Thus, the
government’s cost of capital is reduced.
132

1968-1 C.B. at 49-50.

133

See Little Six, Inc., 210 F.3d at 1362.

134

1981-2 C.B. 15.

135

Id. at 16 (In this ruling, the IRS concluded that a federally chartered tribal corporation
was not taxable on income derived from the corporation’s income-producing activities,
including a catfish hatchery and an annual tribal fair.).
136
411 U.S. 145 (1973) (holding that a provision in the Indian Reorganization Act barred a
use tax that the state sought to impose on personal property purchased out of state and
installed as a permanent improvement on the reservation).
137

See 1981-2 C.B. at 16.

138

Pub. L. No. 100-203, ch. 80, 96 Stat. 2607 (1982).

139

See I.R.C. § 7871(a)(4) (2000).

140

See I.R.C. § 7871(c). This restriction is a major difference between a state’s ability to
raise money with the benefits of § 103 and a tribe’s ability to raise money with the benefits of
§ 103. Section 7871(c) does not cover “passive activity bonds,” (PABs) which are issued by
many states or their agencies for use by or on behalf of private businesses. State and local
governments frequently use PABs for economic development; for example, a regional sewer
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included is an exemption from a number of excise taxes.141 Not included in this list
are the taxes imposed under Chapter 35 of the Code. Of course, if Congress did
include that chapter, Chickasaw Nation and Little Six, Inc. would have been very
easy cases because § 7871 would clearly exempt the tribes from the taxes imposed
by Chapter 35.
Why did § 7871 not include Chapter 35? It was not necessary at that point in
time. Section 7871 was enacted in 1982, but the IGRA was not enacted until 1988.
The IGRA was enacted in large part, if not entirely, as a reaction to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Cabazon Band, decided in 1987. Additionally, Indian gaming
was a relatively small industry when § 7871 was enacted. The first reservation bingo
hall was opened by the Seminole Tribe of Florida in 1979,142 so the industry was
young and apparently not a concern of Congress at the time the Tribal Tax Act was
passed. So what may not have seemed necessary in 1982 was considered important
enough to warrant a comprehensive congressional act just six years later.
But why does all of this matter? Section 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA requires that
certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code apply to Indian gaming operations in
the same manner as they do to state gaming operations.143 In effect, the statute
extended the reach of the Tribal Tax Act to other provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code which deal with the tax provisions of gambling activities. The dispute in
Chickasaw Nation and Little Six, Inc. was how many of those provisions were
covered by § 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA.
B. Warbus v. Commissioner and Its Possible Effects on Tribal Taxation
In Warbus v. Commissioner,144 an individual Indian taxpayer claimed an
exemption from tax on debt discharge income because the income was derived from
an Indian fishing-rights-related activity.145 Income from an Indian fishing-rightsrelated activity is expressly exempted from taxation under § 7873(a) of the Code.146
The taxpayer had borrowed money to buy a fishing boat, which he operated in
fishing-rights-related activities of his nation. After falling behind on his loan
payments, the taxpayer’s boat was repossessed and the Bureau of Indian Affairs
district can issue PABs to build a sewage plant that will then be privately managed. Original
versions of the bill that became § 7871(c) did not include this restriction, but the change was
made when objections were voiced by Representative Gibbons of Florida, who was apparently
concerned that tribes would use PABs to fund the construction of tribal bingo halls. See
Aprill, supra note 114, at 341-47.
141
See I.R.C. §7871(a)(2) (2000). The tribes were treated as a state for the purposes of any
exemption from excise taxes imposed by Chapter 31 (relating to tax on special fuels), Chapter
32 (relating to manufacturers excise taxes), Subchapter B of Chapter 33 (relating to
communications excise tax), and subchapter 36 (relating to tax on the use of certain highway
vehicles).
142

Cynthia A. De Silva, Wagering the Wager War: Tribal Sovereignty, Tribal Gaming,
and California’s Proposition 5 and Chapter 409, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1025, 1048 (1999).
143

See 25 U.S.C. 2719(d)(1).

144

110 T.C. 279 (1998).

145

Id. at 280.

146

See I.R.C. § 7873(a) (2000).
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(BIA), which had guaranteed the loan, paid the lenders the shortage.147 As a result of
this transaction, the taxpayer had income from the discharge of indebtedness. Such
income is normally includable in a taxpayer’s gross income.148 The taxpayer claimed
an exemption from the inclusion of this income because it was derived by an Indian
from the exercise of fishing rights.
The Tax Court disagreed with Warbus. It found that the income from the
discharge of debt was not “directly related” to the harvesting, processing,
transporting, or selling of fish in the exercise of recognized fishing rights of an
Indian tribe, as the statute requires.149 Instead, the court found that this income was
derived from the freeing of his assets from obligations by the BIA.150 The Tax Court
seemed to put strong emphasis on the important tax concept that if Congress intends
to exempt certain income, it must do so expressly.151 The statute did not expressly
include a discharge of indebtedness from the loan used to purchase a boat used in a
fishing rights-related activity, so the Tax Court did not find the income to be
excludable. Interestingly, the Indian Canon of Construction (hereinafter Canon) was
never mentioned in that decision, although there seemed to be some ambiguity in the
statute.
While the decision did not generate a large amount of attention, it did catch the
eye of Professor Erik M. Jensen, who wrote an article on the case soon after it was
decided.152 He believed that the case was wrongly decided for two reasons. First,
there seemed to be no awareness of Indian law principles.153 This probably was not
the Tax Court’s fault. After all, there is no particular reason for Tax Court judges to
be aware of Indian law canon.154 It did not help that none of the briefs, not even the
one for Warbus, contained any hint of the existence of the Canon.155 Even so, this
cannot be an excuse, because the Canon is a part of the law and judges are obligated
to follow it.156 However, judges can and do avoid application of the Canon simply
by purporting to find no ambiguity in the language that is being construed, even
though the language may be inherently ambiguous.157 That did not happen in
Warbus, but it is always unacceptable to ignore the Canon, even if the court is not
made aware of them.

147

See Warbus, 110 T.C. at 280-81.

148
See I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2000) (explicitly stating that income from the discharge of
indebtedness is includable in a taxpayer’s gross income).
149

Warbus, 110 T.C. at 283.

150

Id. at 284.

151

Id. at 283.

152

Jensen, supra note 100.

153

Id. at 692.

154

Id. at 697.
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Id.

156

Id. at 696.

157

Jensen, supra note 100, at 697.
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Second, Professor Jensen argued that the court did not properly read § 7873,
which resulted in an improper interpretation of the statute.158 Namely, the court’s
interpretation of the word “activity” in § 7873 was inconsistent with its use
elsewhere in the Code.159 Additionally, Professor Jensen did not feel that it would
strain the statutory language to consider the debt-discharge income attributable to the
foreclosure on a fishing boat as being directly related to a fishing rights-related
activity.160 This is because income can be attributable to an “activity” even though a
particular taxpayer’s efforts in the activity are minimal or nonexistent.161 The details
and analysis of § 7873 are not important for the analysis of Chickasaw Nation and
Little Six, Inc. However, the Warbus case and Professor Jensen’s analysis of it are
important because they demonstrate some of the interpretational mistakes that seem
to have been made by the court in Chickasaw Nation.
C. Why Courts Often Have Trouble When Tax Law and Indian Law Collide
Already mentioned is one of the main reasons why the courts often have trouble
synthesizing the Code and the Canon – few tax scholars and practitioners know
much about Indian law, and few Indian law experts know much about tax law. In
Warbus, it seemed that little effort was made to get the necessary Indian law issues
on the table – even by Warbus, the person who would benefit from their
application.162 In fact, the Canon is not even mentioned in the opinion. That was in
spite of a long discussion about just what a “directly-related fishing activity” is (or as
it turned out, what is not). If Warbus had argued that the statute was ambiguous,
perhaps this would have created enough of a problem that the court would have felt
obliged to consider the Canon and rule in his favor. Professor Jensen thinks that the
use of the Canon should have made Warbus a sure winner in the case.163
IV. WHAT’S THE RIGHT ANSWER IN CHICKASAW NATION AND LITTLE SIX?
A. A Closer Look at Section 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA
Clearly, the interpretation of § 2719(d)(1) was the major area of disagreement
between the Chickasaw Nation and Little Six, Inc. courts. This statute was what both
tribes used to claim an exemption. Again, the text of the statute reads:
The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (including sections
1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050I, and Chapter 35 of such Code) concerning
the reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings from
gaming or wagering operations shall apply to Indian gaming operations
conducted pursuant to this chapter, or under a Tribal-State compact
entered into under section 2710(d)(3) of this title that is in effect, in the
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Id. at 692.
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Id. at 702.

160

Id. at 705.
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Id. at 704-05.
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same manner as such provisions apply to State gaming and wagering
operations.164
So, the statute requires that certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,
“including” those which are set out in the parenthetical, concerning the “reporting
and withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings from gaming or wagering
operations,” are to apply to Indian gaming operations in the same manner as they
apply to state gaming and wagering operations.
In analyzing § 2719(d)(1), a good starting point is to look at the sections listed in
the statute’s parenthetical to determine what taxes and/or requirements those sections
impose. Already discussed is the fact that Chapter 35 deals with taxes on wagering,
and is the home of § 4401, which imposes the wagering excise tax, and § 4402,
which grants the exemption for state-conducted lotteries.165 Chapter 35 also includes
the occupational tax in § 4411, which is paid by those liable for the tax imposed in §
4401.166 Overall, Chapter 35 covers § 4401 to § 4424. However, nothing in that
chapter mentions the winnings of players. The chapter imposes the excise tax,167 the
occupational tax imposed on those who pay the excise tax,168 miscellaneous
provisions which deal with the definitions of “wager” and “lottery,”169 the
applicability of state laws,170 and disclosure provisions.171 Just by reading Chapter
35, the problem in § 2719(d)(1) becomes obvious: it talks about the “reporting and
withholding taxes with respect to the winnings from gaming or wagering
operations,” but the parenthetical’s reference to Chapter 35 does not seem to fit
there. This is because Chapter 35 has nothing to do with the winnings from gaming
or wagering operations. The reference to Chapter 35 seems unnecessary, at least
when looking at the language outside the parenthetical. So perhaps looking at the
other sections in the parenthetical in § 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA may provide a better
idea as to what Congress was attempting to do in that statute.
Section 1441 of the Code is titled “Withholding on tax of nonresident aliens.”172
Essentially, this section requires persons having the control of the disposal or
payment of any items of income to any nonresident alien or foreign partnership to
withhold a tax of either thirty or fourteen percent (depending upon the type of
income) of the disbursement.173 Some gambling winnings, however, are exempted
from this withholding.174
164

25 U.S.C. § 2719(d)(1).
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See I.R.C. § 4402(3).
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See id. § 4411.
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See id. §§ 4401-05.

168

See id. §§ 4411-14.
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See id. § 4421.
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See I.R.C. § 4422.
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See id. §§ 4423-24.
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See id. § 1441.
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See id. § 1441(a).
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See id. § 1441(c)(11).
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The inclusion of this section seems to make sense in the statute. It clearly gives
instructions as to the withholding of taxes (or, in this case, the exception) from
gambling winnings.
Section 3402(q) also relates to the withholding of certain gambling winnings. It
requires any person making a payment of gambling winnings to withhold a twentyeight percent tax from such payment.175 Again, there are exceptions,176 including
§ 3402(q)(3)(B), which states that the winnings from state conducted lotteries are
subject to withholding only to the extent that they exceed $5,000.177 Obviously, the
reference to this section in the parenthetical makes sense, because it deals with the
withholding of gambling winnings. The statute even contains language specific to
state-conducted lotteries. Therefore, that language, as a result of § 2719(d)(1) of the
IGRA, will control the manner in which the statute is supposed to be applied to
Indian gaming.
Section 6041 of the Code requires all persons in a trade or business who make
payments to another person of $600 or more to prepare a return stating the amount of
any gains, profits, and income of the recipients of such payments.178 It seems fairly
easy to figure out that the purpose of this statute is to make sure that persons who
receive large amounts of money are properly reporting them as income on their tax
returns at the end of the year. This would include big winners in gambling, stateconducted or otherwise. Clearly, this would be a reporting requirement for the
winnings of gamblers at Indian-run establishments. Therefore, the inclusion of this
code section in the parenthetical in § 2719(d)(1) seems logical.
Finally, § 6050I requires anyone engaged in a trade or business who receives
more than $10,000 in one or more related transactions to file an informational return
with the IRS concerning certain details behind such transactions.179 That information
includes data about the person from whom the cash was received, the amount of cash
received, and the date and nature of the transaction.180 The statute does have
exceptions, but they only involve financial institutions and transactions occurring
outside the United States.181 The purpose of this rule should be fairly obvious. It can
detect money laundering schemes182 and identify parties with large cash incomes
who may be underreporting income by spending large amounts of cash.183 But, like
Chapter 35 of the Code, what is lacking in § 6050I is a reference to winnings from
gambling, be it state-conducted or not. Again, it is hard to see the connection
between the inclusion of § 6050I of the Code in the § 2719(d)(1) parenthetical and
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the language outside the parenthetical. Not surprisingly, the Little Six, Inc. court also
made reference to this section in concluding that § 2719(d)(1) is ambiguous.184
It should be kept in mind that the exemption granted in § 2719(d)(1) applies to all
forms of Indian gaming. It is hard to imagine anyone spending $10,000 in just pulltabs. Therefore, the inclusion of § 6050I in the IGRA was apparently placed there to
exempt the operators of Indian casinos from having to prepare returns for big-money
gamblers.
But what is interesting in the context of § 2719(d)(1) is that § 6050I does not
create an exception for state-conducted lotteries, and there is probably no reason to
do it. Since people buy lottery tickets in amounts of far less than $10,000, and since
the sales are made in cash, tracking down anyone who spends $10,000 in a year
would be almost impossible. On the other hand, a lot of money can change hands in
a short amount of time at a casino. One can cash a check for $10,000 worth of chips
right on the spot.185 An Indian casino, save for this provision, would have to report
large transactions like this. But the relation to state gaming operations is mysterious.
The Little Six, Inc. court thought that the reference to § 6050I, as well as the
reference to Chapter 35, was superfluous because neither of them relate to
“winnings.”186
What is left after looking at the parenthetical in § 2719(d)(1)? Of the five
sections (actually, four sections and one chapter) mentioned in the parenthetical, two
of them have nothing to do with the reporting or withholding of winnings.
Obviously, this is an unusual situation. Usually a parenthetical such as the one in
§ 2719(d)(1) is put there in order to clarify the statute. Here, the parenthetical only
makes the statute more confusing. In fact, much of the language in the statute is
superfluous. So it seems that the Little Six, Inc. court was right. The statute is
ambiguous or at the very least, it is confusing and very poorly written.
This results in an all too familiar question: “What was Congress really trying to
do?” Did it only want the provisions of the Code concerning the reporting and
withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings from gaming to apply to the
Indians in the same manner as they apply to state lotteries? That would seem to be
the case if that parenthetical phrase was taken out. Taking out the parenthetical
would make the statute fairly clear, at least as far as the taxes imposed by Chapter 35
are concerned. Since § 2719(d)(1) would only reach provisions of the Code related
to the reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings from gaming,
the taxes imposed by Chapter 35, which do not relate to any of those things, would
not be affected by the statute. Therefore, the argument for an exemption similar to
the one enjoyed by state-operated lotteries would be gone. As a result, the tribes
would clearly be liable for these taxes.
But the parenthetical has to have been put in there for a reason. It could be that
Congress wanted the provisions of the Code sections in the parenthetical to apply to
Indian gaming in the same manner as they do to state lotteries. Since state lotteries
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are exempted from Chapter 35’s taxes,187 the tribes would be exempt from these
taxes, as well. But the question of why the language of the statute only mentions
“the reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to winnings” is still not
answered.
The legislative history does not help much, either. On one hand, the word
“taxation” was removed from the original version of the statute, as Judge Dyk
mentioned.188 On the other hand, one of the statute’s authors stated that Congress
really meant to treat the taxation of wagers conducted by the Indians in the same
manner as wagers conducted by states.189 The fact that this was stated by one of the
statute’s drafters should entitle it to more weight than the Chickasaw Nation court
was willing to give to it, in spite of the fact that it was made long after the fact and
only represents the voice of one senator.190 In the end, there is still no clear answer.
The statute is ambiguous.
B. Further Analysis of the Ambiguous Statute
At this point, after concluding that the § 2719(d)(1) is ambiguous, it would seem
easy to just use the Indian Canon of Construction to settle the matter in favor of the
tribes. If this happens, the interpretation of the statute must be resolved in favor of
the tribes, who would then get the exemption from the tax in § 4401. That is what
the Little Six court did, much to the chagrin of Judge Dyk in his dissent on the
petitions for rehearing.191 However, doing this would ignore another important tax
concept. This is the rule that absent clear statutory guidance, a court will not imply
tax exemptions.
The rule that tax exemptions are not granted by implication is applicable to
taxing statutes affecting Indians as it is to all others.192 If Congress intends to exempt
certain income, it must do so expressly.193 Courts are particularly sensitive to
interpreting statutes to include exemptions when the Indians in the case argue that it
should be a matter of policy. If courts could create or imply tax exemptions based on
policy, many of the federal Indian laws would have the unintended effect of
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exempting Indians from almost all taxation.194 As the Court in Confederated Tribes
of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon v. Kurtz195 stated:
It is one thing to say that courts should construe treaties and statute
dealing with Indians liberally, and quite another to say that, based on
those same policy considerations which prompted the canon of liberal
construction, courts themselves are free to create favorable rules.196
The court went on to say that an exemption from a treaty or non-tax statute can be
found only where there is “express exemptive language.”197
This discussion illustrates what the real conflict in Chickasaw Nation and Little
Six, Inc. really is (or should be). There is a statute, § 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA, which
is ambiguous as to whether it grants the tribes an exemption from the wagering taxes
levied by § 4401 of the Internal Revenue Code, as well as the occupational tax in
§ 4411. On one side, the Indian Canon of Construction says that since the statute is
ambiguous, it must be interpreted in favor of the Indians, so the exemption in this
case should be granted. On the other side, there is a rule of tax law which says that
tax exemptions must be clearly granted, which would mean that the exemption
should not be granted here because there is no “express exemptive language,” as the
Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon court put it. Quite simply, the question is
which of these two rules should prevail.
The Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon court, while not really dealing with
that question because it did not think that the statutes were ambiguous,198 seemed to
lean towards favoring the exemption rule. While it did briefly mention the Indian
Canon of Construction, it spent a considerably longer amount of time, and cited more
cases, discussing the exemption rule. It also repeatedly used the phrase “express
exemptive language” while trying to find a provision to jusstify an exemption.
So then, did the Little Six, Inc. court freely create a favorable rule, as the Warm
Springs Reservation of Oregon court would put it, or did it simply construe an
ambiguous statute in favor of the Indians?
It is more likely that it did the latter. It did not create an exemption to the tax
laws. Congress was clearly trying to create some type of exemptions in
§ 2719(d)(1). The problem is that the language used – or maybe more exactly, a
parenthetical trying to explain the language that was used – made it unclear just what
Congress was trying to exempt. Such poor drafting is certainly not the fault of the
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691 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1982). In Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, a tribe was
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Indians, so why should they bear the burden? That is what the Indian Canon of
Construction does – it ensures that the law errs on the side of the protection of
Indians when the language used by a treaty, statute, or regulation is unclear. The
Little Six, Inc. court recognized the significance of the Canon, while the Chickasaw
Nation court apparently did not.
That is not to say that the Little Six, Inc. analysis is perfect. Judge Dyk raised
some valid questions when he dissented from the Federal Circuit’s denial of the
petitions for rehearing. Still, his analysis does support the assertion that § 2719(d)(1)
is ambiguous. He acknowledges that one cannot give effect to all the language of the
statute without rendering the statute self-contradictory.199 While he was right that the
Little Six, Inc. court should have engaged in more analysis of the statute’s structure,
purpose, and history to produce an interpretation that makes the statute coherent,200 it
seems that even doing so would not produce a clear answer. If, after doing more
work than the Little Six, Inc. court did, the statute’s meaning was still unclear, as it
appears to be, then the Canon should be used to resolve the matter in favor of the
Indians.
C. Where Did Chickasaw Nation Go Wrong?
So, now that the analysis indicates that the Little Six, Inc. decision is right, it
should be noted where the Chickasaw Nation court seemed to err in its analysis.
First, it seems that the court in Chickasaw Nation made many of the same mistakes
in its decision that Professor Jensen thinks the Tax Court made in Warbus.
A very important factor is that there must be concerns in the precedential value of
each of these decisions. In the introduction to his paper, Professor Jensen stated a
concern that the Warbus decision could become extremely bad precedent, as it was a
published decision of the Tax Court.201 Specifically, he worried that the decision
could come to stand for the proposition that the Tax Court could ignore Indian law
principles in tax disputes that involve Indian tribes or Indian tribal members.202 The
same thing almost happened with Chickasaw Nation. Section 7873 of the Internal
Revenue Code, the section which was in dispute in Warbus, had not been the subject
of prior judicial decisions, so the erroneous decision in Warbus could have an
enormous effect in developing an understanding of that section.203 Similarly,
§ 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA had not been the subject of judicial scrutiny before
Chickasaw Nation and Little Six, Inc. Had both courts come to the same conclusion
on the meaning of the statute, that understanding would have been firmly
established. And if Little Six, Inc. had followed the interpretation of Chickasaw
Nation, the interpretation against the tribes would have two decisions in its favor.
This could be particularly troubling because, like § 7873 in Warbus, § 2719(d)(1) is
specifically geared toward the tax consequences of Indian activity. This should be
obvious because § 2719(d)(1) is in Title 25 of the United States Code, which is the
body of Federal Indian law. And a case involving § 2719(d)(1) will never come up
199
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outside the context of Indian law, so there would probably be fewer opportunities for
courts to take a look at this statute and analyze the errors of Chickasaw Nation.
Additionally, both Warbus and Chickasaw Nation demonstrate how judges can
all but disregard the Indian Canon of Construction when its application seems to be
inconvenient. Judges have, on a number of occasions, circumvented the Canon by
simply declaring that the statute is unambiguous.204 Yet they have to acknowledge
the Canon; it is a part of the law.205 But of course, if the statute is not ambiguous,
then the Canon is not a concern. How the Chickasaw Nation court found no
ambiguity in the statute is still difficult to understand. The analysis above describes
how and why § 2719(d)(1) is ambiguous. The Chickasaw Nation opinion couldn’t
explain what the language of the statute means, although it purported to do so.
Because the court thought it knew what the statute meant, it did not concern itself
with the Canon.
For example, rather than break down the statute into smaller pieces, the
Chickasaw Nation court looked at the statute in a very broad sense.206 It spent most
of its time concentrating on policy-driven arguments, which are important in their
own way. But the policy of the IGRA is in § 2702; the statute at issue in the case
was § 2719(d)(1). Before looking at the somewhat fuzzy policy objectives, the Court
should have spent more time analyzing the statute itself to try to determine what the
statute meant.
Particularly odd is the Court’s handling of the reference to Chapter 35 in the
parenthetical of § 2719(d)(1). It calls the statute’s reference to Chapter 35
“somewhat cryptic,”207 but discards that problem by claiming that the most
reasonable conclusion is that the reference to Chapter 35 was to incorporate its
definitions of the terms “wager” and “lottery.”208 It is true that Chapter 35 does
contain definitions for those terms, but they are both contained in one section,
§ 4421. Section 4421(1) defines “wager” and § 4421(2) defines “lottery.” The bulk
of the remaining portions of Chapter 35 deal with the wagering excise tax and the
related occupational tax.209 So, if Congress was really just trying to incorporate those
two terms, why didn’t it just say “§ 4421” instead of “Chapter 35?” The Court did
not address that, and it probably does not have a good answer. And besides, while
§ 4421, does define “wager” and “lottery”, those terms, at least in the context of
§ 4421, still have nothing to do with “the reporting and withholding of taxes with
respect to the winnings from gaming operations.”210 So even if Congress was just
trying to incorporate those definitions, a reference to § 4421 in place of “Chapter 35”
would still be difficult to explain.
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In fact, later in the same paragraph as this Chapter 35 explanation, the Court
seems to unwittingly acknowledge that the § 2719(d)(1) is ambiguous. This passage
near the end of the opinion seems to acknowledge this ambiguity:
In any event, we are unwilling to assume, based solely upon the inclusion
of this parenthetical reference to Chapter 35, that Congress intended to
provide tribes with the exemption from federal wagering excise taxes
enjoyed by the states. Such an assumption would fly directly in the face
of § 2719(d)’s express reference to “the reporting and withholding of
taxes with respect to the winnings from gaming or wagering
operations.”211
That passage, along with the reference to Chapter 35’s inclusion in the
parenthetical being “somewhat cryptic,”212 makes it clear that the Court really had no
idea what the reference to Chapter 35 was doing in the parenthetical. It sees the
conflict between the reference to Chapter 35 and the language outside the
parenthetical. But instead of taking this ambiguity and investigating it further, the
Court simply made up its mind that, whatever all of this language meant, it could not
have meant an exemption to the excise taxes in Chapter 35. The Court simply stated
that if Congress intended to provide tribes with an exemption from the federal
wagering excise taxes, it clearly knew how to draft such an exemption.213 By doing
this, the Canon was kept out of play. Additionally, the Court did not consider other
sections mentioned in the parenthetical, namely § 6050I, and failed to analyze its
somewhat mysterious inclusion therein, as did the Little Six, Inc. Court.214
But before going any farther, it is important to consider the original question
posed in this section. That is the one about the conflict between the Indian Canon of
Construction and the reluctance of courts to imply a tax exemption from ambiguous
statutes. This is bound to come up again in the courts, so the question should be
addressed. Which one should prevail? The Indian Canon of Construction should
prevail.
Unquestionably, the history behind the Indian Canon of Construction has to be a
factor here. By not giving Indians the benefit of the doubt on an ambiguous statute,
it seems that courts would be ignoring the principles behind the government’s
relationship with Indians. The language used by the Supreme Court in a case where
it had to construe ambiguous language in the context of Indian law and taxation,
Squire v. Capoeman,215 probably states it best: “To tax respondent under these
circumstances would, in the words of the court below, be ‘at the least, a sorry breach
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of faith with these Indians.’”216 That faith with which the government should
conduct its affairs with Indians is kept in check, in part, by the Indian Canon of
Construction. This Canon was a part of American jurisprudence long before the
Internal Revenue Code came into being, and should not be ignored in tax cases.
D. Other Policy Concerns Which Support an Exemption
Section 7871 of the Code forces the IRS to treat tribal governments in the same
manner as it does state governments under certain sections of the Code.217 Why
would Congress want to do this? States have a number of essential government
functions that have to be carried out, and of course, the taxpayers of the states are
ultimately the people who pay for these services. The exemptions from many tax
provisions that are enjoyed by state governments are a way to save them money.
The less money that states have to pay to the federal government, the less they have
to take from their citizens in the form of taxes.
The same is true for tribal governments. Indian tribes exert sovereignty over
their land, and like all governments, regulate conduct within the governmental (in
their case, reservation) boundaries.218 In enacting § 7871, Congress recognized this
and granted some (but obviously not all) of the tax advantages enjoyed by states to
tribal governments. The same policy applies as the one that justifies the provisions
that are favorable to state governments.
So why do tribes sell pull-tabs and open casinos? It’s the same reason that states
have lotteries: they are usually cash cows.219 As an example, in 1999, the Ohio
Lottery had sales of approximately $2.145 billion, with prize expenses, commissions,
and operating expenses totaling approximately $1.483 billion.220 That is a profit of
about $662 million dollars, all of it free of tax from the federal government. Why
should it be tax-free? In 1999, $696 million was transferred to fund education, as
required by the Ohio Constitution.221 Since its inception in 1974, the Lottery has
provided over $9.7 billion in support of the state’s public education system.222
Tribal governments are using the profits from their casinos and lotteries,
including pull-tab games, for many of the same purposes. For example, the Oneida
Tribe in New York operates the Turning Stone Casino.223 It has used gaming
revenues to purchase additional land, increasing the size of the reservation from
216
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thirty-two acres to nearly 4,000 acres.224 It has also built a council house, health
services center, senior center, new roads, and a burial ground.225 More in line with
Ohio’s use of lottery money, the tribe has also established scholarship and job
training programs.226 From this, can be seen that states and tribes use the proceeds
from lotteries and other types of gambling for many, if not most, of the same
purposes.
Essentially, this makes it fair to treat states and tribes in a similar manner under
any provision of the Internal Revenue Code. It is a case of horizontal equity:
similarly situated taxpayers should be treated in a similar manner by the tax laws.
While there are differences between states and tribes, they are very similarly situated
in the case of their gambling operations. Both tribes and states run these operations
because they are profitable. Both use the proceeds for similar purposes, which
ultimately serve the interests of the people within the boundaries of the state or
reservation.
V. CONCLUSION
As mentioned earlier, a petition for certiorari was granted on January 22, 2001 by
the Supreme Court in the Chickasaw Nation case. Hopefully, the Court will make a
careful analysis of all of the statutes involved, especially § 2719(d)(1) of the IGRA.
Also, it should not forget about the Indian Canon of Construction and the policies
which make it only fair to treat tribal governments in the same manner as state
governments. With this in mind, hopefully the Court will find that § 2719(d)(1)
should be construed to allow an exemption from the excise and occupational taxes
for these tribes.
Whatever the Court decides, Congress could eventually put an end to this mess
by amending § 2719(d)(1) to make it clear whether these wagers are exempt.
However, a review of legislation introduced since these decisions came out reveals
that no one has proposed an amendment to § 2719(d)(1). That is not surprising,
since this is far from a hot-button issue for most Americans. It is an issue that is
unlikely to receive much attention in the near future, as both political parties will be
concentrating on introducing legislation dealing with the main topics of last year’s
election. Still, it is better for tax issues to be resolved in places other than the courts.
VI. POSTSCRIPT: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
The Supreme Court ultimately decided this issue in Chickasaw Nation v. United
States227 and in a 7-2 decision, ruled for the government.
Justice Breyer wrote for the majority. After reviewing the language of the
statutes involved, the opinion agreed with the Tribes that the reference to Chapter 35
was surplusage, but that the reference to Chapter 35 cannot be given independent
operative effect without “seriously rewriting the language of the rest of the
statute.”228 The opinion also emphasized the rule that when Congress enacts a tax
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exemption, it usually does so explicitly.229 In this case, the Court stated that the
“more plausible role” of the hypothetical was to provide an illustrative list of
examples, and that the reference to Chapter 35 was simply a bad example which may
have been included inadvertently.230 Again, the bad example did not warrant
rewriting of the remainder of the statute’s language, nor did it mean that the statute
was ambiguous, that is, “capable of being understood in two or more possible
ways.”231 Instead, common sense suggests that this cross-reference is simply a
drafting mistake, a failure to delete an inappropriate cross-reference in the bill that
Congress later enacted into law.232
The Court also discussed the legislative history of § 2719(d), specifically the
deletion of the word “taxation” from the language of the statute. The Court stated
that the Tribes’ interpretation of the statute would bring the word “taxation” back
into the language of the statute, even though it was deleted.233
Finally, the Indian Canon of Construction was considered, and ultimately
discarded, by the Court. Accepting as conclusive the Indian Canon “would produce
an interpretation that we conclude would conflict with the intent embodied in the
statute Congress wrote,” so the Court refused to apply the canon in this case.234 The
opinion also pointed out the canon that tax exemptions should be clearly expressed,
and refused to compare the strength of the canons since the Indian Canon of
Construction was inapplicable in this case.235
Justice O’Connor, who was joined by Justice Souter, wrote the dissenting
opinion. Her argument was that even though there was some drafting error in the
statute,236 there is simply no way to tell whether the error was the inclusion of
“Chapter 35” in the parenthetical or the removal of the word “taxation” in the
statute.237 She added that there is no generally accepted canon of statutory
construction favoring language outside of parentheses to language within them.238
As a result, it becomes necessary to turn to other canons of statutory construction.239
She also noted the policy behind IGRA, which is to aid in tribes raising revenue, and
noted that it would seem logical that Congress would have intended the Nations to
receive more, not less, revenue from gaming.240 Because “[t]his Court has repeatedly
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held that, when these two canons conflict, the Indian canon predominates,”241 the
Court should rule in favor of the Indians. She concluded by stating that this case
“provides a persuasive case for application of the Indian canon” because the Court is
only being asked to use the Indian canon as a tiebreaker between two equally
plausible (or implausible) constructions of a troubled statute.242
Justice O’Connor’s opinion does well in explaining why the statute cannot be
unambiguous. It would seem unnecessary that the Supreme Court would have to
decide a case over excise taxes where the statute is unambiguous. It would also
seem likely that if the statute was unambiguous, the Court would be unanimous in its
decision. But, of course, this is not how the majority saw the issue, and without an
ambiguous statute, the Indian Canon is not particularly useful.
Now the wishes of the Tribes are in the hands of Congress. If it really did intend
to provide a tax exemption in this case, it needs to amend § 2719(d) to make this
clear. Justice O’Connor pointed out that such a result would comport with the stated
purpose of IGRA, which is to “provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming
by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic self-sufficiency, and strong
tribal governments.”243 Hopefully, if this was indeed the intent of Congress, it will
remember this policy and quickly act to fix the statute.

JOHN BURGESS
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Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 539.
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See 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).
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